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PONT & COUNTERPODN:
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS
INTRODUCTION: A series of recent and controversial cases has
raised the Issue of how plaintiffs must treat attorneys' fees and
costs that are paid out of otherwise includable settlement or litiga-
tion awards. Plaintiffs facing this problem include civil rights liti-
gants, employees In employment-related litigation, defrauded con-
sumers, and those who recover punitive damages and Interest as
well as excludable awards under section 104(a)(2). For all of these
and others, attorneys' lees and costs are deductible only as item-
ized deductions that are reduced under the regular tax (under both
sections 67 and 68) and complelely disallowed under the alterna-
tive minimum tax. As Judge Beghe's dissent in Kenseth v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. No. 26 (May 24, 2000), demonstrated, if a
contingent fee exceeds 50% of the recovery, the effective overall
tax rate on the net recovery actually received exceeds 50% and if
the aggregate fees exceed 72-7J% of the recovery, the tax can
exceed the amount of the net recovery. Everyone seems to agree
that under tax policy and theory plaintiffs should not be saddled
with this burden. Many have expressed the desire that Congress
amend the Code to correct the problem. As Deborah Geler and
Maxine Aaronson debate below, the more difficult question is
whether courts can act to protect these plaintiffs in the absence of
Congressional action.
POINT:
ONLY CONGRESS CAN
CREATE DEDUCTIONS
By Deborah A. Geiet;
Cleveland, OH*
It the series of recent cases involv-
ing attorney's fees, plaintiffs have
resorted to crealive arguments to get
their desired result via the backdoor
by arguing that the portion of the
award paid to the attorneys for their
fees and litigation costs is "exclud-
able" by then in the first place.' The
impetus driving these cases on the
part of both plaintiffs and judges is
understandable, As described above,
plaintiffs have a legitimate beef, But
judges cannot alter the Code sections
under which certain categories of
deductions for individuals have been
increasingly and severely "devalued,"
Judges have, however, long exercised
a robust power to create common
law in tie aren of what constitutes
"gross income" under the ambiguous
catch-all provision in section 61:
"gross income from whatever source
dlerived." Since an "exclusion" from
income is the economic equivalent of
an inclusion coupled with a full
deduction, plaintiffs permittcd by
judges to exclude the portion of the
award equal to their atorneys' fees
and cosis would avoid the onerous
deduction restrictions that currently
apply to them under the Code but
(under tax theory and policy, at least)
shnuld not apply to theis.
The plaintiffs in these cases make
three arguments, the first two or
which can be raised only if the con-
tract under which the attorneys' fees
and costs are paid is of a contingent.
fee nature, rather than a pay-by-the
hour contract or a flat-fec contract,
win or lose. First, the plaintiffs argue
that they have successfully assigned.
under the assignment-of-income doc-
trine, their property right% to a por-
tion of the recovery equal to their
attorneys' fees and costs because they
gave up all control over that portion
of their recovery under the contin-
genIt-fee contract The notion is that
the contingent-fee contract trans-
multes the nature of their relationship
to that of "joint venturers" with each
pursuing a return on their portion of
the "joint venture." Second, they
* 0 nelinint A. ri 11)(W)h ier2)Pmfemor of a., CevelondIan.Mur oi3(dlrgc or lAw m , c l nd Siate Ui-cmuy.
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argue that the Ol Colony Trust doc-
O irine does not apply ' because, under
the contingent-fee nature of the con-
tract, the plaintiffs had no obligation
it) pay the allorucys for their services.
W 'Third, they argue that, because state
, attorney lien statutes can give the
attorneys a prior right to the portion
Z of any recovery equal I0 fees and
S costs owed to Ihacin, Ihe atlorneys
"own" this portion of the award from
the beginning, not the plaintiffs.
O I have written about the argtments
themselves at greater length else-
O where." My chief interest is not in the
rejoinders themselves but in the larg-
I" er points illustrated by them: that the
z gross-income doctrine does not fit the
problem at hand very well (hit is
used only because it's the only game
o available to achieve the desired end
O, result) and, inore iinporlutnl, can
allow inappropriate "deduction" of
r +-." nondeductible capital expenditures.
One rejoinder deals with the only
argument that would apply equally to
contingctt-fee contracts and other
hourly contracts: the one based on
the existence of state attorney lien
statutes. What about payments to
attorneys in states in which there is
no similar attorney lien statute or in
which the statute is worded In such a
way as to create for the attorneys
only a security interest in the recov-
ery? Should taxpayers really be treat-
ed differently based on such a tent-
ous distinction? Most defendants pay
conlingent-fee awards directly to the
trust account of the plaintiff's attor-
neys, so tile attorney lien statulte has
little real-world effect other than-if
this distinction is accepted-make
some plaintiffs in the country pay tax
on gross awards while others pay tax
on only the net awards actually
received.
With respect io the arguments
applicable only in the cases involving
contingent-fee contracts, what about
fees paid under the occasional hourly
or lInt-rate contract? On the theoreti-
cal and policy merits described
above, it should make no difference
how the fee payment is structured;
the fees shotld be fully deductible in
any event. It is a distinction without a
difference on the ultimate merits.
With respect to cuntingent-fee
contracts themselves, it is not at all
clear that they operate to "assign" a
portion of assignable "property"
income. Nor is it clear that plaintiffs
have no obligation to "pay" the attor-
neys under a contingent-fee contract.
It is jttst as reasonable to argue that
the relationship between the parties is
that of service recipient to service
provider, and that the plaintiffs sim-
ply agreed to measure the worth of
their attorneys' services by reference
to the gross recovery under the law-
suit. The fact that the atorneys "con-
trol" how the suit is prosecuted is
neither here nor there; they are inde-
pendent contractors to their clients,
and all independent contractors retain
control over the means by which they
attain the end result for which they
have been hired. That is the very
nature of an "independent contrac-
tor." Moreover, no actual lax partner-
ship is, in fact, created here, which
would (if one were deemed created
with every conlingent-tree contract)
raise a host of other issues (such as
attorneys claiming a distributive share
of excludable section 104(a)(2) dam-
ages). That a relationship might be
"conceptualized" as a partnership
does not meai that it should e so
treated for tax purposes, and it panic-
ularly does not mean that it should be
so treated for one purpose only but
not for any other tax purposes. The
relationship between the attorneys
and the plaintiffs is respected as one
of service provider to service recipi-
ent for literally every other tax char-
acterization of the relationship, and a
"for-this-purpose-only" departure
frot that model is a baldly manipula-
live one engineered to reach a specif-
ic restli on one tax issue of the plain-
tiffs, which is the type of "selective"
legal argumentation that breeds cyni-
cism in the law.
Moreover, the fact that the assign-
ment-of-income cases arose in the
family context, and that only the
donor or donee-but not both-were
taxed under those eases, does not
mean that attempted "assignments"
of income should be respected out-
side those contexts. Sometimes both
should be taxed, and taxation of the
assignor should not be allowed to be
evaded through distinguishing away
the assignment-of-income doctrine.
This point can be most clearly illus-
trated with Baylin v. United States,'
which is a great case to demonstrate
that it might not be a such a good
idea to jump on the bandwagon and
allow all litigants to exclude the por-
tion of an award equal to the aont
paid to the attorneys under any of
these theories.
The Buylin litigatio was brought
by a partnership challenging what it
considered to be a low valuation of
property seized by the state of
Maryland under its condemnation
power. When the partnership hired an
attorney to appeal the amount of the
condemnation award, it entered into a
contingent-fee contract under which
the attorney would receive a percent-
age of any increase obtained over the
previous valuation. The parties even-
tually settled at a valuation of more
than S16 million, which was signifi-
cantly higher than the original valua-
tion of the property by the state ofr
Maryland of nearly S4 million.
The fee, if not excludable by the
partnership, would not be considered
a deductible "expense" but rather a
nondeductible capital expenditure
pertaining to the condemned proper-
ty, reducing the amount of capital
gain realized by the partnership on
the property transter. The partners
3 In 01.C.IonyT-1 v. Cnndmm nnr, 279 U S. 71h l92y)O.nempo)C's emplayoerd enuxintcquaiyed his ctphe t ypay the cnip .s I t t.n. W m iitdiyd . thn IRS. 11
StprmenCuu elt thit he employee was deemed ti, haoe eectieed theA mnint of laes ~raid on his ehalflineldablte) and then paid them hims:IttnnndedetIhT.e ttmsh unden his
eployment tonmet he hod no right In detand pmyment f thror mounts litrtlly In, himself.
4 See Dletl r45A. Ced .S-, I Afet-dting rh-thnt -n f'iniffs-1WAfla-tr *ti e s .. d Ci itn pTax Vn s3 Wsotnst
.1 41 P3IA 1 (F ted 0, MIA't)
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would be better nIT, taxwise, if they
could exclude the portion of the
award paid as attorneys' fees, since
thai would be equivalent to garnering
all ordinary deduction, The Federal
Circuit rejected an exclusion, howev-
er, concluding both that the assign-
ment-of-income doctrine prevents it
and that the presence of an attorney
lien statute does not change tile
result. Its language also evoked the
Old Colony 7'rust paradigm, though it
did not cite the case.
It seems to me that the facts of
this case demonstrate why this issue
really is properly a "deduction" issue,
and relief for the appropriate cases
should therefore by legislated on the
"deduction" side of the ledger.
Though we might sympathize with
the plight of the litigants unfairly
denied fall deduction of what proper-
ly is characterized as all "expense" in
other litigation-and thus we might be
tempted to nile in their favor tinder
any one, or a combination of, tie
a1rguments posited for "exclusion"-
this case demonstrates how trying to
resolve the problem favorably for the
sympathetic class in this manner can
wreak havoc in a case such as Roylin,
where the taxpayer would effectively
be allowed to deduct a nondeductible
capital expenditure. Collapsing the
"income" and "deduction" into u sin-
gle-step "exclusion" can lead t)
results that would be wrong if we
gave each step tax significance. If,
for example, a civil rights litigant
succeeds in excluding the portion of
the attorneys' fees paid to his attor-
neys under the arguments discussed
here, I can see no grounds on which
to differcittiate tile plaintiff in Baylin,
who should be denied deduction of
the attorney's fees (in favor of capi-
talization) and should not be able to
avoid that result through the back
door.
One would be hard pressed to
make a distinction under the ussign-
ment-of-income doctrine itself
between attorneys' fees that consti-
tite expenses (successfully assigned)
and attorneys' fees that constitute
capital expenditures (unsuccessfully
assigned). The doctrine turns on the
income right itself, which would not
seem to be different in the two sce-
narios. I do not think that one could
reasonably say that the reason why
Baylin should lose even though an
employee suing for back wages or a
civil rights plaintiff should win is that
Mr. Baylin was trying to avoid taxa-
tion on attorney fees that would not
be deductible under the Code if paid
directly. The bald fact is that the
sante is true of these other plaintiffs.
'he only difference between the two
is that these other plaintiffs should be
able to deduct their fees under
income tax theory (because they were
"expenses" directly connected to
includable income), even though they
P !' n
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- are not under tibe current alternative
0 minimum tax, while Mr. Baylin
I_ shouM not under income tax theory
(because they were "capital expendi-
cc tures" that had to be capitalized into
W the cost basis of the asset in litiga-
, lion), Curing tie problem on the
deduction side of the ledger would
Z ensure that only those attorneys' fees
n that are properly deductible (because
a they are "expenses" rather than "capi-
tal exlenditures") would escape taxa-
0 tion.
Moreover, these doctrines are not
06 particularly well suited to the prob-
lem at hand; the cases have been
I,- shoehorned inlo thcm onlv hecause
there is no other plausible arguments
2 that would relieve these plaintiffs of
the deduction restrictions that would
O otherwisc apply. The doctrines pro-
vide many dark corners in which it
make jistinctions that might, on first
readhig, sound superficially plausible
unde- a strict construction of the doc-
trine itself (such as the distinction
between services income and proper-
ty income tinder the assignment-of-
income doctrine and the difference
between contiigent-ree and pay-by
the-hour contracts) but which make
no sense in the larger context of the
problem at hand, The results should
not be affected by whether the recov-
ery consists of compensation income
or recovery on a "claim" ihat is tania-
mount to a property righl; by whether
the attorneys are paid on a contin-
gency basis, by the hour, or under a
flat fee; by whether the attorneys'
fees are paid for trial work or appel-
late work;' and, finally, by the hap-
penstance of the language in any state
attorney lien statute that exists in the
plaintiff's jurisdiction. Yet, under the
Ilrce-)ronged analysis in these cases,
these immaterial differences have
affected outcomes.
Congress, not the courts, should
act now to fix the problem-and do
so retroactively for all open tax years,
COUNTERPOINT:
LET'S NOT FORGET
THE FOREST WHILE
EXAMINING THE TREES
by Mdxine Aaronson,
Dal/as, 7X*
First, it is important to point up
areas or agreement with Professor
Geier. Virtually no one (except per-
haps 535 elected officials in
Congress) actually believes that it is
appropriate or good tax policy to fail
to allow some sort of credit for attor-
neys fees against the AMT. A close
reading of the Kenseth opinion and
dissent leads me to believe that the
Tax Court was split, not on whether
attorneys fees should be somehow
removed from the gross income cal-
culation, but on whether or not they
had the power to do anything about
it. My favorile illustrative case is
I'a raghar it City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998). Fortunately tor her,
Ms, Faraghar lives in the Eleventh
Circuit, which has followed the
Cotina, rule. Assume though, that
she lived elsewhere: what would her
tax consequences be in, say, the
Ninth Circuit? Faraghar was a sex-
ual harassment case clarifying that
employers can be vicariously liable
for the actions of their employees.
She was awarded one dollar in actual
damages and recovered her attorneys
fees, which reportedly ran some
S325,000. Does anyone really think
that Ms. Faraghar should be privi-
leged to pay more than $80,000 in
taxes ont of her own pocket for hav-
ing the courage to pursue what was
clearly unpleasant, but important, liti-
gation?
The alternative minimum tax was
originally passed to deal with a small
number of very wealthy individuals
who were paying little or no tax.
Disallowing any offset or allowance
for attonileys fees simply does not hit
the "target market" of the AMT.
Instead, it penalize.s middle class tax-
payers who collect taxable (amages
for once-in-a-lifetime events as rec-
onpcnsc for an occurrence that most
taxpayers would just as soon not
repeat, regardless of the net economic
gain. If the purpose of the AMT is to
influence the behavior of taxpayers
who use certain deductions on a
recurring basis, then the position of
the Service penalizes the innocent
while missing the real target. About
this, most tax professionals agree.
The debate is about what to do about
it, and who can do it. Professor
Geier believes that the solution must
coi from Congress, and nowhere
else, because she views the issue as a
deduction issue. Clearly, her solu-
tion is one way to solve the problem.
But is it the only way? Coinain and
Estate of Clarks take the view that
the attorneys fee portion is never the
income of the litigant to begin with.
Therefore, it is not includable under
section 61 and a corresponding off-
setting deduction is not necessary.
The fact that this theory neatly side-
steps the mismatch of income and
expense under the AMT is not a rea-
son to discard it, if it is otherwise jus-
tifiable.
Stepping hack from the specific
problem and analyzing the "econom-
ic deal" between the parties is often
useful in tax matters, where sub-
stance triutnphs over form. What
then is the ceonomic deal between
lawyer and client in a traditional con-
tingent tee arrangement? At its most
basic, a traditional contingency fee
arrangement is a transfer of an eco-
nomic interest in the end product in
exchange for services necessary to
produce the end result. On what the-
ory should one party have to report as
gross income 100% of the product,
and the second patny report a portion
as well? Section 61 defines income
broadly, but not so broadly as to
include picking up the income of
another.
I See Nster v.U.S.. 2000.I U.S.'C. CClI I.t 150-3 1N.D. Ala.)lningenl fee (t tdil-rlal - ,o k I u¢t r.llfa,-Itgnnd he-umic rih to the Incme i.n. .,4 ;dir1cinly rpne, hN , incene
rcc, for npe I Ile.lencl -rmr iler a jiry held in mr or I'h ff -lainl 1eel" nnesnlIIIy t n il ,11 wn1n l i, et ripe tio awsnl),
- NO,& ine Antolinl ae n, I pnhoilltnter In ralli. Tiji . She eurenenly chairs Ie i Nelcins Indicdal.l Intene lo , 7 .eniltmnicntee o Iv pictl irp, Jly ulig,.
HeinOnline  -- 20 Newsl. 16 2000-2001
